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The future of the East Asian political economy: 
China, Japan and regional integration
As international newspaper headlines increasingly focus on energy and security issues, one could almost forget that the main ties that 
bind states and regions of the world together are trade and economic relations. 
Maaike Hei jmans
From the 1970s onward, international economic rela-tions have been broadened to include the political sphere 
– marking the start of much discussion on ‘the political 
economy of…’. Politics in this respect encompasses not only 
international political relations but especially domestic poli-
tics, cumulating in the so-called ‘two-level game’1. This dual 
approach is particularly useful in a region where economic 
means have been used, arguably more than anywhere else, 
for international as well as domestic political purposes: the 
East Asian region.
The current status of East Asia, (i.e Northeast and Southeast 
Asia), should be attributed first and foremost to the economic 
success and attractiveness of the region. Notwithstanding the 
much debated loose political integration, economic connec-
tions in the region are profound, although for a long time at 
the inter-firm and inter-regional rather than the inter-state 
level. Causes, explanations and possible solutions for issues 
in international relations of the region in the broadest sense 
of the word – the political economic, but also energy and secu-
rity issues – should be sought therefore first and foremost in 
the field of political economy. The three developments in the 
field of political economy that I believe will shape the future of 
international relations of East Asia are addressed here. These 
are the development of China, the relationship between China 
and Japan, and the economic integration between countries 
in the region. The changing role of the United States in the 
region is of great importance with regard to the second and, 
to a lesser extent, the third development. In conclusion, the 
importance of these developments in general and for the EU 
in particular are sketched briefly.
Development of China
Whether spoken of in terms of the ill-phrased ‘peaceful 
rise’ or the more recent ‘peaceful development’ slogan2, 
the development of China is a crucial factor in the shaping 
of East Asia’s international relations. Not only does China’s 
growth depend on domestic policies, reform and stability 
– China’s success or failure affects the region as a whole. 
China has become economically interconnected with the 
region to the extent that real and even perceived (in)stability 
will significantly affect other East Asian countries, as did 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Japanese ‘bubble’ in the 
early 1990s.
China is revitalising its relations with countries in the 
region, particularly the countries grouped in the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN countries 
are engaged in a balancing act of taking the opportunities 
their large neighbour has to offer while not being overshad-
owed by it. China is conscious not to be seen as an econom-
ic threat, as its proposal for a free trade area with ASEAN 
back in November 2000 illustrates. This move by China 
was largely geopolitically motivated. It should be seen as an 
attempt to engage neighbouring states and shed the threat 
perception stirred by China’s success in attracting industrial 
jobs and foreign investment. The success of China’s policy 
of engagement, as well as the positive but wary attitude of 
ASEAN-countries, was apparent when another step toward 
the creation of the full completion of the free trade agree-
ment was taken last January. Following the signing of the 
trade-in-services agreement, Philippines President Arroyo 
said: ‘We are very happy to have China as our big brother in 
this region’3.
The domestic challenges faced by China (analysed in detail 
in the latest of a series of World Bank regional studies in 
East Asia4) are diverse and profound. Cities and liveabil-
ity, cohesion and inequality, and corruption are of crucial 
importance in managing the domestic distribution of eco-
nomic rents. The Chinese government itself also recog-
nised these challenges and placed internal challenges high 
up the agenda. Indeed, President Hu’s recent proposal for 
a ‘harmonious socialist society’ has been interpreted as one 
of the most profound shifts since Deng geared the country 
towards high growth rates by opening the country to for-
eign investment5. The success or failure in making China’s 
development sustainable will for these reasons – and as 
suggested by the two-level game – have a profound influ-
ence on the region.
The relationship between Japan and China
Notwithstanding signs of improvement since the inaugura-
tion of Japanese Prime Minister Abe last September, relations 
between Japan and China are extremely fragile. Bilateral rela-
tions fell to an historical low in recent years, and while this 
deterioration long resulted in ‘cold politics, hot economics’, 
they came to a point where even economic relations were 
increasingly politicised. The Japanese business lobby, grouped 
in Nippon Keidanren, openly expressed concern to its govern-
ment and urged it to repair relations with China – and, for 
that matter, South Korea6. The sudden decision in 2005 of the 
Japanese government to end ODA loan aid to China should 
also be seen in this (political economic) perspective, while tak-
ing into account the legacy of war and colonial past in bilateral 
relations. The sudden shift in ODA policy can be attributed 
to certain Chinese policies, the deterioration of relations, the 
fast economic development of China and its implications for 
Japan, and a general aid fatigue of public opinion7. Opinion 
polls found that public perceptions of the other country in 
Japan as well as China have deteriorated. The percentage of 
Japanese who indicate they ‘like’ China had been decreasing 
already from the mid-1990s, and fell below five percent in 
recent years8. One only has to remember the Chinese booing 
of the Japanese team during the final of the Asian Cup in 
2004 and the fierce anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 to 
understand why. The Chinese on their side, have been much 
antagonised by the continuing visits of former Prime Minister 
Koizumi to the infamous Yasukuni Shrine. The government 
has taken the change in Japanese leadership as an opportunity 
to mend ties, however. The Chinese government was remark-
ably quiet following Abe’s comments on so-called ‘comfort 
women’ in March - a clear indication of the strong desire to 
improve relations and avoid dismay prior to Premier Wen’s 
visit to Japan. The unprecedented shift in media coverage 
from a focus on historical issues to coverage of contemporary 
Japan in connection with Wen’s trip is confirms this9. The Chi-
nese government is obviously raising pressure and playing for 
high stakes, at the risk of extensive domestic criticism should 
Abe betray Wen’s faith. The new engagement between China 
and Japan is a positive sign, but tensions remain despite the 
warm rhetoric on both sides. Important questions are yet to be 
answered.  notably whether or not  Abe will visit the Yasukuni 
Shrine and whether he will gain support for his policy in the 
Upper House elections in July.  Abe’s position  was weakened 
by the quick fall in his popularity domestically soon after his 
inauguration, but more recently the Prime Minister regained 
credit for engaging China  while not seeming soft, and for his 
long overdue visit to the United States in April. A complex 
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Rituals, pantheons, 
and techniques: 
a history of Chinese 
religion before the Tang
The study of Chinese religion over the last 30 years has led to 
fundamental changes in the way we see Chinese history and civilisation. 
The traditional paradigm – that saw China as an empire governed 
by an agnostic, philosophically sophisticated elite and populated by 
superstitious masses – has been overturned, but nothing coherent has 
replaced it. 
John Lagerwei j
A recent conference in Paris aimed to do precisely that: create a new para-digm for the understanding of Chinese religion from the ancient period to 
the end of the 6th century, by which time the basic contours of Chinese religion 
had stabilised into the familiar configuration of the Three Teachings and what 
most students now call shamanism.
If this had not hitherto been attempted, it is at least in part because of the explo-
sion of knowledge and the increasing specialisation that accompanies it. But it is 
also because of the lack of a unifying theory or, at the very least, methodology. The 
answer to the first difficulty is to invite leading specialists to work together and, to 
the second, to propose a common approach. It is this common approach which 
will be the key to success or failure and which, therefore, requires explanation.
This approach is, in the first place, multi-disciplinary, relying on philology, 
archaeology, and epigraphy as the foundations of any well-rounded account of 
an ancient society in which texts remain a primary source. In a certain sense, 
the key role is played here by archaeology, in part because of the vast range of 
new textual and iconographic materials it has provided, but also and perhaps 
above all because material remains, deposited in tombs whose shape and con-
tents vary over time and space, offer hitherto unimagined, nearly direct access 
to daily life, actual practice (as opposed to ideological prescription), and regional 
cultural variety. 
The second critical feature of the approach is that it is at once sociological and 
anthropological. The determined focus of the work on rituals, pantheons, and 
techniques reflects the weaning away of religious studies from philosophy, 
thanks in large part to the impact of the anthropological study of societies with-
out written texts. Religion is now seen to consist in techniques of communica-
tion with the invisible; it is about what people do, whom they address, and how. 
Mythology and other modes of discourse are implicit in ritual gestures, spatial 
dispositions, and iconographic traditions.
The search for meaning in Chinese religion must give pride of place to this 
implicit as opposed to the explicit discourse because it is through rituals and 
around specific gods that social groups are constituted and the empire defines 
itself. The discovery of the centrality of ritual in Chinese social and political life 
and elite discourse concerning them is relatively recent, but it has come increas-
ingly to dominate the Sinological agenda. In organising the chapters of each suc-
cessive volume around the two basic issues of religion and society and religion 
and the state, the project aims at keeping the focus on the sociological dimen-
sions of religion. Inclusion of chapters on hagiography, sacred geography, and 
festival calendars confirms the overriding emphasis on religion as practiced.
But perhaps the most important innovation of all is the inclusion of shamanism, 
because if the emergence of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism as China’s 
three major religious traditions is the central subject of Chinese religious his-
tory from the founding of the empire in 221 BCE down to the end of the sixth 
century, this emergence goes together with a joint attack on traditional, sha-
manistic modes of interaction with the invisible world. But shamanism does 
not just go softly into the deep, dark night. It remains central to popular forms 
of religion to this day, and its Buddhist and Taoist rivals for ritual monopoly 
also integrated important aspects of shamanism into their own practices. Any 
history of Chinese religion which considers Chinese society to be its real subject 
ignores this dynamic interaction at its peril. <
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mix of international and regional status, bilateral rivalry and 
domestic politics defines the bilateral relationship.
Rivalry between the Japanese and the Chinese cannot be 
understood apart from both countries’ aspiration for leader-
ship in the region – or, better, wariness of the other country 
taking a leadership position. While the United States remains 
a great power in the region, its supremacy is waning as Chi-
na’s influence grows. Preoccupied with the Middle East and 
Central Asia, the Americans furthermore give leeway for and 
even encourage Japan to take a more pro-active role in the 
region. Neither Japan nor China however, seems in a position 
to claim a leadership role now or in the near future.Through 
an active policy of economic diplomacy, Japan has throughout 
the past decades led the region in economic terms. It did not 
however, actively seek to translate this position into leadership 
in a more general sense. This changed as China started gain-
ing prominence on the world stage and is increasingly spo-
ken of as a future leader of the region. The speech by Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso in December 2005, in which he presented 
Japan’s objective to be a regional thought leader, a stabiliser 
and a country that wants to build mutual relationships of 
trust, showed Japan’s new ambitions. Japan’s proposal for an 
East Asian community and East Asian Economic Partnership 
Agreement should be seen as further proof of its renewed 
interest in and engagement with the region. Undeniably 
however, Japan is losing leverage over countries of the region. 
While ASEAN countries are, for economic reasons, inclined 
to lean increasingly towards China, for political reasons they 
welcome a more active Japan. The China-Japan relationship 
thereby will shape East Asia’s political economy.
Economic integration in 
East Asia
A third factor that is to profoundly influence the future of the 
political economy is the region’s path of economic integra-
tion. Integration was throughout the 1970s and 80s based on 
expansion of (private) Japanese production networks, spurred 
by the Plaza Accord of 1985. The 1990s saw attempts to state-
led intra-regional integration, mainly through APEC. While 
monetary co-operation took off successfully in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis of 1997-98, inter-regional economic 
integration largely failed due to lack of political will on the 
side of numerous East Asian countries. Since the beginning 
of the new century however, economic integration has taken a 
more regional (Asians-only) turn and advanced through gov-
ernment level talks and negotiation10. China’s entry in the 
WTO in 2001 provided an essential stimulus to this effect and 
the United States’ more permissive stance – as opposed to its 
earlier strong disapproval of Japan’s proposal for an Asian 
Monetary Fund – increased possibilities. Here also, domestic 
as well as international developments merit attention.
As traditional regionalisation is increasingly complemented 
by efforts toward regionalism, an increasingly complex ‘noo-
dle bowl’ is connecting countries and sectors of economies11. 
Although the term is not usually used in this sense, a second 
‘noodle bowl’ of institutionalised relations through inter- and 
intra-regional institutions is forming. Throughout the past 
decade East Asia has seen a surge in government-led initia-
tives for regional co-operation, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+112 
and the East Asia Summit. Generally these gatherings have 
been talking shops more than they have been able to produce 
real results, however. What East Asia needs now, is manage-
ment, not vision13.
Much is still uncertain about where East Asian integration 
is heading. While some suggest that bilateral and regional 
agreements are undertaken with the final goal of integrating 
the whole region, others foresee that increased fragmentation 
will come to a point of no return. The question is whether 
countries are in for short-term gain or for real economic inte-
gration in the long term. It is high time to create oversight at 
the government level and to manage the two noodle bowls 
before they become too knotted to unravel. The ASEAN+3 
grouping encompasses the major production networks span-
ning East and Southeast Asia and is experienced in political 
engagement with other regions, notably through the Asia-
Europe Meeting. A more institutionalised process spurred by 
these countries therefore provides the most likely route to suc-
cess. Consciously structured or not, the regional framework 
for political economic relations of the future will be outlined 
throughout the next decade.
The future of East Asia’s political economy is important for 
observers in and outside the region. Increasing regional trade 
integration notwithstanding, East Asia is still one of – if not 
the – most open regions of the world. It is of major impor-
tance for its largest trade partners – the European Union 
(EU) and the United States – to ensure that East Asia remains 
open and transparent. For this purpose, increased under-
standing and co-operation between the regions is required. 
With regard to the EU-China strategic partnership however, 
one analyst remarks that three years after its announcement, 
‘it has become clear that political rhetoric on the scope and 
nature of EU-China relations has yet to catch up with political 
reality.’14 Regrettably, critique of inter-regional co-operation 
resembles that of East Asian intra-regional cooperation. The 
EU as well as a stronger ASEAN+3 should make an effort to 
turn the tide.
In his presentation of the Communication that is part of the 
renewed China strategy of the EU, Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson commented that ‘trade policy stands at the cross-
roads of the EU’s internal and external policies’14. For the 
EU, just as for the East Asian region, the political economy 
remains a two-level game involving domestic as well as inter-
national interests. But EU policy of putting tariffs on textiles 
from China as recent as late 2006, is not setting the right 
example. <
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